ABSTRACT We study the security of a variety of cryptographic tasks including traditional privacy (e.g., seeded extractors, encryptions, commitments, and secret sharing schemes) and differential privacy from the perspective of α-mutual information. As far as we know, encryption scheme, commitment, and differential privacy have been studied via mutual information based on the Shannon entropy. Though Bellare et al. in CRYPTO 2012 have got some results about encryption schemes, the upper bound of mutual information is not the tightest. Though Cuff and Yu in CCS 2016 mentioned the direction of the Rényi entropy generalization, only a few results about differential privacy were obtained, and even for Shannon entropy, the proof in that paper has some limitations. In this paper, we propose a modular and unified framework to study the relations between statistical security and mutual information security for a series of privacy schemes other than prior work that focused on a special scheme. In addition, we introduce α-mutual information security via the Rényi entropy for a series of privacy schemes and aim to bridge the gap between statistical security and α-mutual information security. By resorting to an improved upper bound on the difference between the Shannon entropy of two distributions, the convexity of a function, useful equality about statistical distance, and the absolutely homogeneous property of α-norm, we obtain rigorous proofs of their essential equivalence. An extra fruit is that the relations between mutual information security and statistical security of encryption and commitment schemes are improved. Hence, two fundamentally different ways of defining privacy security are connected.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel is a channel where one aims to communicate data with information-theoretic security under the sole assumption that the channel from sender to adversary is ''noisier'' than the channel from sender to receiver. Since Csiszár and Körner [1] and Wyner [2] introduced it in the late 1970s, it has been developed in the information and coding (I&C) community in parallel with the development of Modern Cryptography. Recently, the wiretap setting in wireless networks has roused much interest in practice. One important aim in this area is to bridge the gap between
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran Tariq. information theory and cryptographic treatment. Essentially, even if the setting is not the wiretap channel, it's still valuable and meaningful to study the relationships between distancebased and entropy-based security metrics.
For encryption schemes, Bellare et al. [3] show that mutual information security implies statistical security by reducing to Pinsker's inequality and conversely that implies mutual information security via general relations between mutual information and statistical distance, where the mutual information security is defined via Adv mis (ε; ChA) = max M I 1 (M ; ChA(ε(M ))), where I 1 represents the mutual information based on the Shannon entropy, ChA means the adversary channel, and ε : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} λ reperesents the encryption function. Meanwhile, people explore the relations between distance-based and entropy-based security metrics in the contexts of key-agreement [4] and statistically-private commitment [6] respectively by employing the techniques similar to [3] . In addition, for statistically secure symmetric encryption, the relations of some different notions of indistinguishability are studied by Iwamoto and Ohta [7] . Zhang [32] studied the upper bounds of mutual information in terms of the statistical distance, which are better than that in [3] . However, Zhang's result was not applied to improve the upper bound in [3] , [4] , and [6] .
As a precise mathematical constraint, differential privacy aims to ensure each individual user's information privacy in a database even though the aggregated information in the database is queried and revealed. In other words, any two adjacent databases that differ in only one entry, are statistically indistinguishable based on a probabilistic metric. Until now, several works [8] - [14] have been done to study differential privacy based on mutual information. McGregor et al. [13] gave an upper bound of mutual information for differential privacy. Afterwards, De [11] employed this upper bound to obtain I (X n , Y ) ≤ 3 n, where X n is a database with n entries and Y is the output of a differentially private mechanism with X n as the input database. Meanwhile, Alvim et al. [8] and Barthe and Köpf [9] presented and proved an upper bound using min entropy instead of the usual Shannon entropy. Recently, Wang et al. [14] introduced the concept of ''mutual information privacy'' metric and studied it. Other than the above results based on unconditional mutual information, in 2016, Cuff and Yu [10] used conditional mutual information to study differential privacy, where some prior knowledge of the database is known by a potential adversary, and obtained an equivalent definition of privacy, which makes some subtleties of differential privacy clear. Though Cuff and Yu [10] presented the direction of the Rényi entropy generalization for the security of differential privacy, only a few results were obtained, and even for Shannon entropy, the proof in [10] was not easily understood.
It's well known that entropies are used to quantify the randomness, uncertainty, or diversity of a distribution. Shannon entropy is typically not the ''right'' notion of entropy for cryptography, because it is possible to define pathological distributions that have high Shannon entropy but are useless to cryptographic algorithms (Please see the Preliminary Section for details). Two main types of entropy are min entropy and collision entropy [15] , [16] . Nevertheless the min entropy is a stronger limitation about the randomness of a source than the collision entropy. It's theoretically interesting and practically meaningful to unify them by the Rényi entropy [17] , since the Rényi entropy is the more general notion of entropy, which includes the min entropy, Shannon entropy, collision entropy, and some other entropies. Moreover, a couple of literatures [18] , [19] have presented its advantage compared with a special entropy (e.g., collision entropy). Thus, it's meaningful and valuable to expand existing results via the Rényi entropy.
The notion of α-mutual information is the generalization of mutual information using the Rényi information measures. The most common generalization ways are those suggested by Arimoto, Csiszár, and Sibson, all of which are equivalent when maximizing over all distributions P X (see [10] , [20] ). The α-mutual information in this paper is the one defined by Arimoto [21] .
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES
In this paper, we propose a modular and unified framework to study the relations between statistical security and mutual information security for a series of privacy schemes other than [3] , [6] , [10] , and [25] that focused on a special scheme (i.e., encryption scheme, differential privacy, commitment scheme). The above idea is partially inspired by Dodis and Yao [16] , Bosley and Dodis [22] , and Dodis et al. [23] who considered extractor, encryption, commitment, secret sharing, and differential privacy under a general framework. Additionally, we introduce α-mutual information security via the Rényi entropy for a series of privacy schemes and study the relations between statistical security and α-mutual information security under a modular and unified framework. We show rigorous proofs of their essential equivalence, and hence two fundamentally different ways of defining privacy security are connected. We briefly expand on our contributions and techniques below.
Define the α-mutual information security of an encryption scheme with encryption function Enc : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ as Adv mis (Enc) = max M I α (M , Enc(M , R)), where the maximum is over all possible distributions on {0, 1} m . It should be noted that here we don't consider the adversary channel ChA, one reason is that I α (M , ChA(Enc(M ))) ≤ I α (M , Enc(M )) always holds. Similarly, we define the α-mutual information security of seeded extractors, weak bit commitment, secret sharing, and differential privacy.
We introduce a modular and unified framework to show that statistical security implies mutual information security under certain parameter constraints. Though Bellare et al. [3] have got some results, the bound of which is not the tightest. We abstract the proof idea of [3] to more general privacy schemes and employ a better bound proposed by Zhang [32] .
In addition, we introduce a modular and unified framework to show that α-mutual information (with α = 1 as a special case) security implies statistical security under some other parameter constraints. Though Cuff and Yu [10] have already observed that (R n , δ)-mutual information secure differential privacy implies (1 − 2H −1 1 (ln 2 − δ))−differential privacy, the proof idea has some limitations, and we use some techniques to overcome them. More concretely,
• In [10] , a complementary binary channel is induced to construct a binary symmetric channel. For a binary channel, it's easy to understand. However, if the channel is non-binary, what can be done? Inspired by this question, we revisit the channel capacity. Other than using the convexity of I (X , Y ) and a complementary channel, VOLUME 7, 2019 we use the convexity of the function S(x, y) def = x log x y . We observe that the original non-binary channel capacity is still lower bounded by the capacity of a binary symmetric channel.
• Instead of resorting to the data processing inequality in [10] , where it fixes a measurable subset, the meaning of which isn't clear, here we employ a fact about statistical distance. More precisely, we adopt the equality
where Y and Y are two distributions over {0, 1} λ .
• When we expand the results based on the Shannon entropy to the counterpart based on the Rényi entropy, we resort to the properties of α-norm other than the fact that ''The function P(V ) = V α is a convex function if and only if the Hesse Matrix of the function P is positive semi-definite'' to simplify the proof as the operation of the Hesse Matrix is omitted.
Based on the above ideas, we obtain the following results: Result 1: If a privacy scheme (i.e., encryption, seeded extractor, weak bit commitment, T -secret sharing, differential privacy) A is (R n , δ)-statistically secure with 0 < δ ≤ 1− 1 2 λ , where λ is the output length of the corresponding scheme, then A is (R n , δ log(2 λ − 1) + H 1 (δ))-mutual information secure. (Please see Theorems 2-6 for details.)
Result 2: If a privacy scheme (i.e., encryption, seeded extractor, weak bit commitment, T -secret sharing, differential privacy) A is (R n , δ)-α-mutual information secure with 0 < δ < 1, then A is (R n , 1 − 2H −1 α (1 − δ))-statistically secure. (Please see also Theorem 10.) An extra fruit is that the relations between mutual information security and statistical security of encryption and commitment schemes are improved.
Briefly speaking, we show rigorous proofs of their essential equivalence, and hence two fundamentally different ways of defining privacy security are connected.
B. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review some notations, show the comparison of different entropies, and present the concepts of statistical security and mutual information security for several privacy schemes. In Section III, we propose the relations between mutual information security and statistical security. In Section IV, we study the relations between α−mutual information security and statistical security. Then we compare our results to prior work in Section V. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a positive integer n, we use the notation [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We call a family of distributions over {0, 1} n a source, denoted as R n . Denote U n as a uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . In the rest of the paper, 2 will be considered as the bases of all logarithms. The α-norm of a real vector V =
Consider two random variables Y and Y over {0, 1} λ . The statistical distance between Y and Y is defined as
The Rényi entropy of order α of a random variable X is defined as H α (X ) = 
is the same as the definition of collision entropy (resp. conditional collision entropy); if α → ∞, then H α (X ) (resp. H α (X |Y )) converges to the min entropy (resp. conditional min entropy); if α → 1, then H α (X ) (resp. H α (X |Y )) converges to the Shannon entropy (resp. conditional Shannon entropy).
The mutual information of X and Y based on min entropy is defined as
More generally, the mutual information of X and Y based on the Rényi entropy is defined as
A. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ENTROPIES
To illustrate the differences between the notions: min entropy, collision entropy, and Shannon entropy, consider a distribution X over {0, 1} n as follows (see also [24] ).
It should be noted that even though X has the Shannon entropy linear in n, we cannot expect to extract bits that are close to uniform or carry out any useful randomized computations with one sample from X , because it gives us nothing useful 99% of the time. Thus, we should use the stronger measures of entropy given by the collision entropy or min entropy. Though the Shannon entropy satisfies many nice identities that make it quite easy to work with, while the min entropy and Rényi entropy are much more delicate [24] , we attempt to generalize existing results based on the Rényi entropy by resorting to some mathematical tools.
B. STATISTICAL SECURITY
Recall the definitions of privacy schemes in [16] by expanding the ''bit'' to more general message length as follows. Definition 1 (Statistically Secure Encryption Scheme): A (R n , δ)-statistically secure encryption scheme is defined as a pair of functions Enc : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ and Dec : {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , where Enc(x, r) and Dec(c, r) can also be denoted as Enc r (x) and Dec r (c) respectively, satisfying that: (a) Correctness: for each x ∈ {0, 1} m and r ∈ {0, 1} n ,
each distribution R ∈ R n and any two different messages
Definition 2 (Statistically Secure Seeded Extractor):
We say that Ext : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ is (R n , δ)-statistically secure seeded extractor if for every x ∈ {0, 1} m and every distribution R ∈ R n , we have
In a commitment scheme, the sender Alice is allowed to commit a chosen statement (i.e., value), but at the beginning the receiver Bob does not know what the value equals and in a later stage the committed value can be revealed by Alice. Any commitment scheme has two essential properties: ''binding'' and ''hiding''. Roughly speaking, the property that it's ''hard'' for Alice to change her commitment after she has made it is called ''binding''; the property that it's ''hard'' for Bob to know the committed value without Alice revealing it is called ''hiding''.
Both of these properties can be information theoretical or computational. Unfortunately, information theoretically binding and information theoretically hiding properties can not be achieved at the same time. Other than using computational notions, here binding property is relaxed to some very weak property, and hence both this very weak binding property and hiding property can be defined from information theoretical perspective.
Definition 3 (Statistically Secure Weak Bit Commitment):
It should be noted that the binding notion here is much weaker than that in the traditional commitment notion, where if it is ''hard'' to find r 1 and r 2 satisfying Com(1; r 1 ) = Com(0; r 2 ), then we say that the binding property holds. In other words, here if by uniformly choosing r 1 = r 2 , the attacker can not win with probability no less than 1 2 , then we say that it's weak binding. For instance, for each x, R ∈ {0, 1}, let Com(x; R) = x ⊕ R. We can easily verify that for any δ > 0, it's a weak bit commitment.
In what follows, we define the concept of T -party Secret Sharing, which involves two thresholds T 1 and T 2 with 1 ≤ T 1 < T 2 ≤ T satisfying that (1) any T 2 parties can recover the secret, but (2) any T 1 parties have ''no information'' about the secret. For simplicity, here let T 1 = 1 and T 2 = T .
Definition 4 (Statistically Secure T −Secret Sharing Scheme): A (R n , δ)−statistically secure T −secret sharing scheme is a tuple (Share 1 , Share 2 , . . . , Share T , Rec) satisfying that: (a) Correctness: Rec (Share 1 (x, r) , . . . , Share T (x, r)) = x for each r ∈ {0, 1} n and each x ∈ {0, 1} m ; (b) Statistical Hiding: for each j ∈ [T ], each R ∈ R n , and every two different messages
A mechanism is differentially private for all queries h ∈ H if replacing an entry in the database with one containing fake information only changes the output distribution of the mechanism by a small amount. In other words, evaluating the mechanism on two neighboring databases, does not change the outcome distribution by much.
Definition 5 ([(R n , δ)-Differential Privacy] (See [10])):
Let H be a family of query functions. A mechanism A is (R n , δ)-differentially private if for any query h ∈ H, any two neighboring databases D 1 , D 2 , and any distribution R ∈ R n , we have
In this section, we define the security of privacy schemes based on mutual information. For encryption schemes, by replacing the Shannon entropy in the concept of mutual information security [25] with the Rényi entropy, we get the definition of α-mutual information. More generally, we use this idea to define other privacy schemes. Assume that α ∈ [1, ∞) ∪ {∞} in this section.
Definition 6 (α-Mutual Information Secure Encryption Scheme): A (R n , δ)-α-Mutual Information secure encryption scheme is a tuple of functions Enc : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ and Dec : {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , where, for convenience, Enc(x, r) (resp. Dec(c, r)) is denoted as Enc r (x) (resp. Dec r (c)), that satisfy two properties below. (a) Correctness: for all x ∈ {0, 1} m and r ∈ {0, 1} n , Dec r (Enc r (x)) = x; (b) α-Mutual Information Security: I α (M , Enc R (M )) ≤ δ for every distribution M over {0, 1} m and every distribution R ∈ R n . Remark 1: To keep consistent with previous literature, if α = 1, α in I α can be omitted without confusion.
The formula in the above definition in fact looks like a channel capacity formula one would encounter in expressing the fundamental limit of communication through a noisy channel. This limitation removes any concrete distributional assumption and makes α-mutual information security a property of the scheme itself.
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Similarly, we define α-mutual information security of other privacy schemes (e.g., seeded extractor, weak bit commitment scheme, T −secret sharing scheme, and differential privacy) as follows. x, r) , . . . , Share T (x, r)) = x for every r ∈ {0, 1} n and every x ∈ {0, 1} m ; (b) α-Mutual Information Security: for every index j ∈ [T ], every distribution M over {0, 1} m , and every distribution R ∈ R n , it holds that
Definition 7 (α-Mutual Information Secure Seeded Extractor):
Definition 10 (α-Mutual Information Secure Differential Privacy): Let α ∈ [1, ∞) ∪ {∞}, and H be a family of query functions. A mechanism A is (R n , δ)-α-mutual information secure differential privacy mechanism if for any query h ∈ H, any two neighboring databases D 1 , D 2 , every distribution D over {D 1 , D 2 }, and every distribution R ∈ R n , we have
Remark 2: When α = 1, α-mutual information can be simplified as mutual information without confusion.
III. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MUTUAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND STATISTICAL SECURITY
In this section, we explore the relations between mutual information security and statistical security of privacy schemes based on the Shannon entropy. Other than [3] , [6] , [10] , and [25] that focused on a special scheme (i.e., encryption scheme, differential privacy, commitment scheme), here we introduce a modular and unified framework to study the relations between statistical security and mutual information security. Though Bellare et al. [3] have got some results, the bound of which is not the tightest. Here we abstract the proof idea to more general privacy schemes and employ a better bound proposed by Zhang [32] . Moreover, by borrowing and improving the new technique proposed by Cuff and Yu [10] , which focuses on differential privacy, we get improved or new results for a series of privacy schemes.
A. STATISTICAL SECURITY IMPLIES MUTUAL INFORMATION SECURITY
Instead of using the upper bound on the Shannon entropy difference between two distributions in [25] , here we resort to the upper bound proposed by Zhang [32] . Though the corresponding upper bound in [25] is a slight strengthening of that in [27] , and similar bounds are are shown in [33] , the upper bound shown by Zhang [32] is better (see [32] for details).
Assume that X and Y are two distributions over {0, 1} m and {0, 1} λ respectively. For simplicity, in what follows, the pairwise statistical distance between X and Y (see also [25] 
Lemma 1 (See [32] ): Let P, Q be two probability distributions over {0, 1} λ , and δ = SD(P, Q). Then
The function g is a nondecreasing function over the interval (0, 1
Since 0 < δ ≤ 1 − 1 2 λ , it can be easily seen that
Therefore, we get that
Hence, the function g is a nondecreasing function. Lemma 2 (See [25] ): Let X and Y be two random variables over {0, 1} m and {0, 1} λ respectively. Then for any fixed
Theorem 1: Let X and R be two random variables over {0, 1} m and {0, 1} n respectively. Denote the function f :
Assume that there exists x 0 such that
(1)
where the second inequality is due to Lemma 1 and the last inequality is because of Claim 1 and Lemma 2.
In what follows, we obtain the relations between mutual information security and statistical security for encryption scheme, seeded extractor, weak bit commitment scheme, T -secret sharing scheme, and differential privacy respectively.
Theorem 2: If A is a (R n , δ)-statistically secure encryption scheme, where the encryption function Enc
Proof: Assume that A is a (R n , δ)-statistically secure encryption scheme.
Define f (x, r) def = Enc r (x). Then PSD(X , Enc R (X )) ≤ δ. By Theorem 1, we get that , it can be seen that the upper bound in Lemma 1 is better than the result in [25] , which states that for two probability distributions P, Q over {0, 1} λ and δ = SD(P, Q), it holds that |H 1 (P) − H 1 (Q)| ≤ 2δ ·log 2 λ δ . (Please see [25] for details if necessary.) Correspondingly, Theorem 2 here is better than the result in [25] .
Theorem 3: If A is a (R n , δ)-statistically secure seeded extractor, where the extractor Ext : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ , and
Proof: Assume that A is a (R n , δ)-statistically secure seeded extractor. Define f (x, r) def = Ext(x, r). Then PSD(X , Ext(X , R)) ≤ δ. By Theorem 1, we get that Then PSD(X , Com(X , R)) ≤ δ. By Theorem 1, we get that By Theorem 1, we get that 
Proof: Assume that A is a (R n , δ)-differential privacy mechanism. For any two neighboring databases D 1 and
By Theorem 1, we get that
Remark 4:
The bounds of and Theorems 4 and 6 are different from the counterparts proved in [6] and [10] respectively. In fact, the results here can be considered as complementary results of [6, Th. 4.1 a)] and [10, Lemma 3] respectively.
B. MUTUAL INFORMATION SECURITY IMPLIES STATISTICAL SECURITY
Recall that Cuff and Yu [10] have already observed that (R n , δ)-mutual information secure differential privacy implies (1 − 2H −1 1 (ln 2 − δ))−differential privacy, the sketch proof of which is as follows.
By fixing an arbitrary pair of neighboring database instances and employing the data processing inequality, the general database and query response can be reduced to the binary database and binary query response respectively, that is, the randomized mechanism P Y |X with binary input and binary output is only needed to be considered. The channel capacity of the binary communication channel P Y |X has a upper bound δ according to the assumption that the randomized mechanism satisfies max P X I (X , Y ) ≤ δ.
By introducing a complementary channel of the original channel P Y |X , a binary symmetric channel, which is a convex VOLUME 7, 2019 combination of the original channel and the complementary channel, is derived. The original channel and the complementary channel have the same channel capacity, which is no less than the capacity of the binary symmetric channel. The capacity of the binary symmetric channel can be expressed as an increasing function of the statistical distance between the conditional output distributions of the original channel. Therefore, an upper bound on the channel capacity for the binary symmetric channel implies a upper bound of statistical distance between the conditional output distributions.
It should be noted that the above proof idea has some limitations, and we use some techniques to overcome them. More concretely,
• A complementary binary channel is induced to construct a binary symmetric channel in [10] . For a binary channel, it's easy to understand. However, if the channel is non-binary, it would not work. Inspired by this question, we employ the convexity of the function S(x, y) def = x log x y other than using the convexity of I (X , Y ) and a complementary channel. We observe that the original non-binary channel capacity is still lower bounded by the capacity of a binary symmetric channel.
• Other than resorting to the data processing inequality in [10] , where it fixes a measurable subset, the meaning of which isn't clear, we resort to a fact about statistical distance. Namely, we adopt the equality
where Y and Y are two distributions over {0, 1} λ (see also Dodis' Lecture [26] for details). Based on the above ideas, we present a general theorem which can be applied to a series of private schemes.
Theorem 7: Denote the function f : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ . Assume that for every distribution X over {0, 1} m and R ∈ R n , it holds that I (X , Y ) ≤ δ, where Y def = f (X , R) and 0 < δ < 1. Then
Proof: Consider a distribution R ∈ R n and a special distribution X , that is, let X be a uniform distribution over
Instead of using the data processing inequality by Cuff and Yu [10] , where it fixes a measurable subset, here we employ the relation about statistical distance. Namely, we will
Without loss of generality, assume that there exists an adversary Eve 0 such that
From the corollary of Theorem 2.8.1 (the data processing inequality) (see [27] ), it's straightforward to get the following claim.
Claim 2: Let X and Y be two distributions over {0, 1} m and {0, 1} λ respectively. Assume that F : {0,
Therefore, we have that
Therefore, Proof: The Hesse matrix of the function S is ≥ 0, and
∂x∂y ) 2 = 0, that is, all of its principal minors are nonnegative, the Hesse matrix of the function S is a positive semi-definite matrix. Therefore, S is a convex function over (0, 2] × (0, 2].
Hence,
Correspondingly, we get that
Therefore, 1 − H 1 (
is an increasing function when w ∈ (0, 1 2 ), we have that
As the above inequality holds for all x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} m with x 0 = x 1 , we get that 
Proof: By replacing the function f with Enc, Ext, Com, Share j for each j ∈ T , and query function h, respectively, we get the conclusion.
IV. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN α-MUTUAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND STATISTICAL SECURITY
The Shannon entropy is only considered in [3] . Though Cuff and Yu [10] have attempted to generalize the results based on the Shannon entropy to the counterparts based on the Rényi entropy, only a few results have been obtained for ε-differential privacy, which are different from the concept of (R n , δ)−differential privacy here. For privacy schemes (e.g., seeded extractors, encryption, weak bit commitment, secret sharing, and differential privacy) (see [15] , [16] , [28] ), the min entropy and collision entropy are more suitable tools. It's meaningful and skillful to generalize the result via the Rényi entropy. We'll attempt to achieve this goal below.
In what follows, we generalize Theorem 7 via the Rényi entropy.
Theorem 9: Denote the function f : {0, 1} m × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} λ . Assume that for every distribution X over {0, 1} m and
Proof: Consider a distribution R ∈ R n and a special distribution X , that is, let X be a uniform distribution over {x 0 , x 1 } where x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} m . From the assumption, it holds that I α (X , Y ) ≤ δ.
By following some results in the proof of Theorem 7, we get that
Therefore, 
Proof: Define the function P :
From [29] , we have that wV α = w V α and V 1 +V 2 α ≤ V 1 α + V 2 α for any V 1 , V 2 ∈ [0, 1] 2 and a positive constant w. Therefore, w 0 P(
holds for any V 1 , V 2 ∈ [0, 1] 2 , and any w 0 , w 1 ∈ (0, 1) with w 0 + w 1 = 1. Correspondingly, let
Then we get the conclusion. Based on the above facts, we get that
(1) Firstly, we consider the general case that α > 1 as follows.
(2) Now consider the case that α = ∞. From the result of (1), we have that
Correspondingly, from the result of (1) and (2) , and Theorem 7, we have that for any α ∈ [1, ∞) ∪ {∞},
Since for any fixed α ∈ (1, ∞) ∪ {∞}, H α (w) is an increasing function in w ∈ (0, 1 2 ), we have that
Therefore,
α (1 − δ). As the above inequality holds for all x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} m with x 0 = x 1 , we get that
It's very surprising and meaningful that the relations between α-mutual information security and the statistical distance can be unified for every α ∈ [1, ∞) ∪ {∞}! Remark 5: It should be noted that instead of employing the fact that ''The function P(V ) = V α is a convex function if and only if the Hesse Matrix of the function P is positive semi-definite'', here we resort to the absolutely homogeneous property of α-norm, which is much simpler as the operation of the Hesse Matrix is omitted.
Remark 6:
From the above proof, we see that no matter what the secret source R (i.e., weak source, SV source, block source, BCL source, etc.) is, as long as the maximum of the α-mutual information between X and f (X , R) is small enough, then the statistical distance between f (x 0 , R) and f (x 1 , R) is small enough for any two different points x 0 and x 1 .
Theorem 10: If a privacy scheme (i.e., encryption, seeded extractor, weak bit commitment, T -secret sharing, differential privacy) A is (R n , δ)-α-mutual information secure where 0 < δ < 1, then A is (R n , 1 − 2H −1 α (1 − δ))-statistically secure. Proof: By replacing the function f with Enc, Ext, Com, Share j for each j ∈ T , and query function h, respectively, we get the conclusion.
V. COMPARISON TO PRIOR WORK
Recall that Bellare et al. [3] show that (R n , δ)-mutual information security implies √ 2δ-statistical security for encryption schemes. By borrowing some techniques [10] in the background of differential privacy, we can improve the result of [3] . More concretely, we get the following result: If A is a (R n , δ)-mutual information secure encryption scheme, then A is a (R n , 1 − 2H −1 1 (1 − δ))-statistically secure encryption scheme. Since the technique in [3] is similar to that in [6] , in parallel, Theorem 8 is an improvement of that in [6] .
Though Cuff and Yu [10] have already directed one orientation: the Rényi Entropy Generalization, they mainly obtained the result ''If the mechanism P Y |X n satisfies -DP, then sup P X n I s α (X n ; Y ) ≤ n nats.'' Here we explored the reverse direction and observed that for a differential privacy mechanism, (R n , δ)-α-mutual information security implies (R n , 1 − 2H −1 α (1 − δ))-differential privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the security of a variety of cryptographic tasks including traditional privacy (e.g., seeded extractors, encryptions, commitments, and secret sharing schemes) and differential privacy from the perspective of α-mutual information. We introduced the concepts of α-mutual information security for a series of privacy schemes. We proposed a modular and unified framework to show that statistical security implies mutual information security under certain parameter constraints. We abstracted the proof ideas in prior work to more general privacy schemes and employed a better bound proposed by Zhang [32] . Additionally, we presented a modular and unified framework to show that α-mutual information (with α = 1 as a special case) security implies statistical security under some other parameter constraints. An extra fruit is that the relations between mutual information security and statistical security for encryption and commitment schemes in prior work [3] , [6] , and [25] were improved. In future, we will attempt to further develop the relations between α-mutual information security and statistical security for privacy schemes.
